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Woods: Woods: Due Process Right to Privacy:

Due Process Right to Privacy: The Supreme
Court's Ultimate Trump Card
Lawrence v. Texas'
I. INTRODUCTION

The best method for creeping up on a person is taking baby steps toward
him, gradually getting closer, until suddenly you are next to him and he did
not even realize you were coming. This is also the best way to change policy
and law. This method is called incrementalism and instead of creeping toward a person, legislatures sneak towards new policies and courts inch towards expansions of law. Legal incrementalism becomes a problem when the
courts, rather than the legislatures, sneak towards new policy instead of expansions of law. Such unauthorized policy shifting is what Lawrence v.
Texas is all about.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

One evening, the Harris County Police Department of Houston, Texas
dispatched officers to the private residence of John Geddes Lawrence ("Lawrence") to investigate a reported weapons disturbance. 2 Upon entering the
apartment,3 the officers discovered Lawrence and Tyron Garner ("Garner"),
both adult men, engaging in sexual relations. 4 Pursuant to the Texas Penal
Code, 5 the men were arrested, charged and convicted
of "deviate sexual inter6
course.., with a member of the same sex."
Lawrence and Garner challenged the constitutionality of the Texas stat-7
ute, alleging violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Texas8 Constitution. 9 The Texas trial court rejected both
arguments.' 0 Lawrence and Garner then pleaded nolo contendere, and the
Court fined each man $200 and assessed court costs at $141.25."
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. Id. at 2475. It appears from the facts that the reported weapons disturbance
was a pretense to expose Lawrence and Garner as homosexuals since they were not
actually charged with any weapons-related crimes.
3. "The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned." Id.
4. Id. at 2475-76.
5. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003).
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. TEX. CONST., art. 1,§ 3a.
9. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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The men then appealed the case to the Texas Court of Appeals. On this
appeal, the court considered arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 12 In a divided opinion, the appel3
late court rejected the constitutional attacks and affirmed the convictions.1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause or the petitioners' liberty
and privacy interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case and held that the
substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the liberty and privacy interests of consenting adults to freely engage in private intimate conduct. 5 In so holding, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick. 16

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Role of State Legislatures
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."' 7 The Tenth Amendment effectively guarantees state police power.
Interpreting the limits of this power, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he
traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for
the public health, safety, and morals."' 8 The Court has also noted that "the
police power is not confined to a narrow category; it extends ...

to all the

great public needs."' 19 As the creators of state law, legislatures are responsible for defining the police powers applicable to their respective states. In
Furman v. Georgia, Justice Burger stated:
in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to

respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people
...[because] it is the legislature, not the Court, which responds to

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruledby Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
19. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952).
20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/9
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public opinion
and immediately reflects the society's standards of
2
decency. '
Thus, the Supreme Court has established that the Constitution guarantees certain police power to the States including the regulation of public
health, safety, and morals as defined by the state legislatures, the primary
group responsible for reflecting that state's beliefs.
B. Role of the Courts
In 1803, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the role of
courts regarding application of the law in Marbury v. Madison.22 There, the
Court declared that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 23 Thus, judicial review was born. In
Washington v. Glucksberg,24 Justice Souter outlined his understanding of
judicial review. He opined
the basic concept of judicial review with its possible displacement of legislative judgment bars any finding that a
legislature has acted arbitrarily when the following conditions are met: [1] there is a serious factual controversy over
the feasibility of recognizing the claimed right without at the
same time making it impossible for the State to engage in an
undoubtedly legitimate exercise of power; [2] facts necessary to resolve the controversy are not readily ascertainable
through the judicial process; but they are more readily subject to discovery through legislative factfinding and experimentation. 25
As Justice Souter pointed out, the nature of judicial review is that it is in
continual conflict with legislative judgment. In addressing this conflict, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed that "the judiciary may not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines." 26 The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits
the
27
judiciary from substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature.
21. Id. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
22. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
23. Id. at 177.
24. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
25. Id. at 786-87 (Souter, J., concurring) (numbers added for clarity).
26. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) ("States are not required to
convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do no sit as a super-legislature to deterPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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C. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been a much debated topic with many varied
definitions. In Poe v. Ullman, a case involving a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, 29 Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's
dismissal because he felt a constitutional question was at hand. He declared:
This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech,
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... 30
Justice Harlan advocated a strict scrutiny analysis rather than rational
basis review for those instances where the state invades the privacy of the
home due to its character as "a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty."' 31 He
further claimed that "it is difficult to imagine what 32
is more private or more
intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations."
Four years later, the Supreme Court had occasion to review Poe in Griswold v. Connecticut,33 a case with facts substantially similar to Poe. After
finding that the right to privacy denied in Poe indeed exists and is implied in
the penumbras of various Constitutional amendments, 34 the Court posed the
question, "[w]ould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The
mine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) ("Under
the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 526 (1951) ("[T]his Court's power ofjudicial review is not 'an exercise
of the powers of a super-Legislature."') (quoting Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III.
28. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
29. This case laid the foundation for Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); however, Poe refused to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, holding
this to be a non-justiciable controversy due to plaintiffs' failure to show that they
would suffer harm through enforcement of the statute. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508-09.
30. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

32. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

34. Id. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). The court
found the right to privacy in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
Id. at 484-85.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/9
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very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship., 35 Consequently, the Court struck down the Connecticut statute as
unconstitutional 36 but failed to mention the applicable standard of review.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg claimed that "the concept of
liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined
to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights ... [and] it embraces the right of
marital privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution.",37 He then identified the method for determining which rights are to be
deemed fundamental, by stating that "judges are not left at large to decide
cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to
the 'traditions and (collective) conscience of our people' to determine
whether
a principle is 'so rooted (there) . . . as to be ranked as fundamen,, 38
tal.
Justice Black dissented on the grounds that protections of privacy were
applicable only "at certain times and places with respect to certain activities.' 39 Black criticized the ambiguity of a general right and cautioned that
finding power in the Due Process Clause "to measure constitutionality by [the
court's] belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to [the court's] own notions
of 'civilized standards of conduct' . . . is an attribute of the power to make
laws, not of the power to interpret them." 40 He claimed that this standard of
review "would
make . . . this Court's members a day-to-day constitutional
1
convention.'
Following the Griswold decision, the Court invalidated a similar statute
in Massachusetts on Equal Protection grounds in Eisenstadt v. Baird42 because it differentiated between married and unmarried people. Although
Eisenstadt largely skirted the privacy issue, it did find that "[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen43
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
The Court appeared to apply rational basis review and rejected the State's

35. Id. at 485-86.
36. Id. at 485.
37. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)) (alteration in original).
39. Id. at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
43. Id. at 453. This sentence has been cited for the proposition that the right to
privacy in Griswold is available on an individual level. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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proffered arguments because the statute was a poor "fit" for its purported
goal.44
Following Eisenstadt was Roe v. Wade,45 a case denying states the
power to criminalize abortions prior to viability of a fetus. The Court found
the statute unconstitutional under strict scrutiny and declared that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy." 46 The
Court recognized that privacy "has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education. '47 The Court then boldly asserted that the right to privacy
encompassed "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.",48 However, the Court repeatedly ' 49
cautioned that "[t]he privacy right
involved ...cannot be said to be absolute.

Justice Rehnquist dissented on the grounds that the privacy the Court
spoke of was a far cry from that found in the protections of the Bill of Rights.
He also cautioned that "the adoption of the compelling state interest standard
will inevitably require this Court to examine the legislative policies and pass
on the wisdom of ...whether
a particular state interest put forward may or
50
may not be 'compelling.'
After Roe, the Court heard Carey v. Populations Services Interna-

tional,51 another contraceptive controversy regarding the prohibited distribution of contraceptives to people under the age of sixteen.52 Following Roe,
Griswold and Eisenstadt,the Carey Court, applying strict scrutiny, found a
"constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing," 53
54
which "extends to minors as well as to adults."

44. Id. at 448-50.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (citation
omitted). This assertion was made based on a variety of decisions recognizing a right
to privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
48. Id. at 153.
49. Id. at 154-55.
50. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
52. Id. at 681.
53. Id. at 688.
54. Id. at 693.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/9
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In a concurring opinion, Justice White determined that the Court should
be more hesitant to use a compelling state interest standard.5 5 He argued that,
historically, nothing required legislation to meet a compelling state interest
merely because it implicated sexual freedom and that such a test "should be
imposed by courts with deliberate restraint in 56
view of the respect that properly should be accorded legislative judgments."
Justice Rehnquist dissented, again finding that the Court was encroaching upon the legislative power of the state government. He argued that not
allowing New York to use its police powers to legislate morality was a "departure5 7from a wise and heretofore settled course of adjudication to the contrary.

With an expanding definition of privacy under the Due Process Clause,
the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick58 provided a surprising backtrack. The
Bowers Court held that there was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, despite its obvious privacy implications. At the outset of the opinion,
the Court stated that "any claim that [prior] cases... stand for the proposition
that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting 59adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.,
The Court determined that homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental
right because it was not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"60 After examining statutes from thirty-six states as well as the common
law, the Court found that no such right existed in the nation's history and
tradition; in fact, the nation's history and tradition spoke against such a
right.6 1 The Court refused to invalidate morality as a rational basis for such a
prohibition, saying that "[t]he law.., is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. 6 2
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted, "[t]his is essentially not a
question of personal 'preferences' but rather of the legislative authority of the
63
State.
Justice Blackmun's dissent argued that there exists in all individuals a
"fundamental interest ...

in controlling the nature of their intimate associa-

tions with others." 64 "Indeed, the right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the
55. Id. at 705 (White, J., concurring).

56. Id. (White, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003).
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
61. Id. at 194.
62. Id. at 196.
63. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy." 65 Justice Blackmun asserted that the state failed to establish a legitimate state interest because
"mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one's value system
66
cannot be a legally cognizable interest."
Justice Stevens also authored a dissent indicating that morality was an
insufficient basis for upholding a statute. "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice ...."67
Justice Stevens further asserted that Griswold,Eisenstadt and Carey stood for
a "right to engage in nonreproductive,
sexual conduct that others may con68
sider offensive or immoral.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. The Court deemed review of Bowers v.
Hardwick6 9 necessary to determine the outcome of the instant case. 70 In reexamining Bowers' holding that the Constitution did not contemplate homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right, the Court reviewed the prior cases
finding a right to privacy in intimate relationships. Beginning with their decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,71 the Court noted that the Due Process
Clause protected a right to privacy in the marital relationship and the option
to use contraceptives. 72 Then, the Court examined its decision in Eisenstadt
v.Baird,7 where, through the Equal Protection Clause, 74 it expanded "the

right to make certain
decisions regarding sexual conduct ...beyond the mari' 75
tal relationship."
The Court went on to show that Griswold and Eisenstadt formed the
backbone for the decision in Roe v. Wade. 76 In showing Roe to have recog-

nized that substantive due process has "fundamental significance in defining

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

(2003).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472

Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2477.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2477.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/9
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the rights of the 78person," 77 the Court once again noted the broad scope of the
right to privacy.
Following a comparison of its prior right to privacy decisions, the Court
began a factual comparison between Bowers and Lawrence.79 The Court first
noted a difference between the statutes. 80 The Bowers statute prohibited consensual sodomy regardless of the participants' genders, whereas the Lawrence
statute ?1rohibited consensual sodomy only between participants of the same
gender. 1 Next, the defendants in Lawrence were prosecuted, unlike the defendant in Bowers.82 The Court then condemned its own characterization of
the issue in Bowers,83 saying that it demeaned homosexuals by implying that
a homosexual relationship was only about engaging in sodomy." The Court
also scolded the underlying statutes as "seek[ing] to control a personal relationship that.., is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." 85 The Court concluded that the86Bowers decision "misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it."
The Court noted that the Bowers Court relied heavily on "ancient roots"
prohibiting the same or similar conduct. 87 Then, the Court analyzed society's
historical disapproval of homosexual conduct, citing that laws typically prohibited the conduct, regardless of participants' genders, because of its nonprocreative nature. 88 The Court then evaluated enforcement of the conduct
under the laws and noted that it did not seem that the laws were "enforced
against consenting adults acting in private;" rather, the convictions noted
were most often for predatory acts lacking consent. 89 Drawing from this
analysis, the Court found that "one purpose for the prohibitions was to ensure
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court also makes brief mention of Carey v. Population Services
International,431 U.S. 678 (1977), where it invalidated a New York law that forbid
the "sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under 16 years of age";
however, they included no analysis of the decision. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.
79. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2477.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The characterization of the issue in Bowers stated: "The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2472.
84. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2478-79.
89. Id. at 2479. The Court suggests that rules of evidence may be the reason for
this disparity of enforcement because the consenting partner was considered an accomplice and therefore incompetent to testify. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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there would be no lack of coverage if a predator committed a sexual assault
that did not constitute rape as defined by the criminal law." 90 In analyzing
the historical roots of the prohibition, the Court found that laws specifically
targeting same-sex couples and criminalizing their sexual conduct did not
emerge in the United States until the 1970's. 91 Even then, only nine states
adopted such prohibitions. 92 The Court pointed out that in recent decades,
those nine states have taken steps toward abolishing their same-sex prohibitions. 93 Summarizing the findings of the Bowers Court, the Lawrence Court
stated that the "historical premises [set forth in Bowers] are not without doubt
and, at the very least, are overstated." 94
The Court went on to address the fact that "for centuries, there have
been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. 95 The
Court pointed to Judeo-Christian morality and ethics as guiding the antihomosexual sentiment. 96 Contrary to the Bowers Court, the Lawrence Court
characterized the issue as questioning "whether the majority may use the
power of the State to enforce
97 these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law."
The Court noted that while some authority embraced anti-homosexual
sentiments, the Model Penal Code "did not recommend or provide for 'criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private."' 98 Justice
Powell observed that historical non-enforcement of these prohibitions was
further evidence that their existence had outlasted their utility.99 In contrast
to Justice Burger's emphasis in Bowers on Western civilization and JudeoChristian moral and ethical standards, the Lawrence Court pointed to British
Parliament's abrogating laws penalizing homosexual conduct.1U° A parallel
case from the European Court of Human Rights even found a law penalizing

90. Id.
91. Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 2480.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 372 (1980)). The American Law Institute gave three reasons for not prohibiting private consensual sexual
relations:
(1) The prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct
many people engaged in; (2) the statutes regulated private conduct not
harmful to others; and (3) the laws were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail.
Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE cmt. 277-280 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)).
99. Id. at 2481.
100. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/9
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homosexual conduct invalid.' 0 ' The Court noted that of the twenty-five states
originally prohibiting sodomy, only thirteen continue to prohibit sodomy,
with only four enforcing the laws exclusively against homosexual individuals.1°2 Within those thirteen states, the Court found a "pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private." 0 3 The Court
then addressed recent decisions following Bowers that confirmed that the
right to privacy extended to decisions regarding marriage, 0procreation,
con4
education.
and
rearing
child
relationships,
family
traception,
The Court passed over the Petitioners' equal protection argument, saying: "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants."' ' The Court felt that a decision based on due process would
better serve the appellants' interests and eliminate
the stigma derived from
06
the criminalization of homosexual conduct.1
Embracing Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers, the Court found that "the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice."'' 0 7 The Court then overruled Bowers'0 8 and emphasized that the
conduct at issue in Lawrence was private, consensual and between adults. 109
Thus, "[t]heir right to liberty under the Due Process Clause g[ave] them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government."' 10
The Court briefly explained the Framers' inability to forecast and account for all possible scenarios."' The Court stated that the Framers "knew
times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws
' 12
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress." "
In a final vote of 6-3, the Court found that the statute failed to promote a
legitimate state interest, therefore violating the right to privacy, and held the
statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2481-82 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
105. Id. at 2482.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2483.
108. Id. at 2484.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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Amendment. The Court reversed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and
1
remanded the case for further proceedings. 13
B. The Concurrence
While agreeing that the Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy was
unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor based her concurring opinion on the Equal
Protection Clause as opposed to due process. 1 4 She found that the statute
protected no legitimate state interest in that it only exhibited a desire to harm
a "'politically unpopular group.""' 5 Justice O'Connor pointed to the fact that
the Texas statute criminalized sodomy only for same-sex couples and said
nothing about heterosexual couples.116 She declared that, in effect, the statute
"brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.' 17 The State
argued promotion of morality as its legitimate interest; however, Justice
O'Connor rejected this argument stating that "[m]oral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to
She
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. '
found the State's moral disapproval of homosexual sodomy to be a restatement of its desire to exhibit animosity towards homosexuals.'9
The State argued that its statute was not directed at persons, but rather at
conduct.120 Justice O'Connor countered this argument by claiming that such
conduct was so "closely correlated with being homosexual" that it made "'the
conduct that defines the class criminal."",12' For these
22 reasons, she found the
Clause.'
Protection
Equal
the
of
violation
statute in

113. Id.

114. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
116. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Later, O'Connor seems to suggest that preserving the traditional institution of marriage would be considered a legitimate state
interest and withstand Constitutional review. Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2486-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
122. Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C. The Dissent
Justice Scalia authored the dissent and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in the opinion.' 23 Scalia first attacked the Court's disregard for precedent in overruling Bowers. 24 Then, he pointed out that the
Court did not even truly address the central issue in Bowers by failing to "declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process
Clause; nor [did] it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would
be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental
right. ,,,125

Scalia attacked the Court's willingness to overrule precedent due to
widespread criticism of Bowers, noting that Roe v. Wade also received widespread criticism, but there the Court used that criticism to justify its holding. 26 Scalia outlined his perception of the Court's determinative test for
overruling precedent, requiring that: "(1) its foundations have been 'eroded'
by subsequent decisions; (2) it has been subject to 'substantial and continuing' criticism; and (3) it has not induced 'individual or societal reliance' that
counsels against overturning."'127 He then noted that Roe satisfied all the req8
uisite conditions, yet has consistently been affirmed rather than overruled.12
While Scalia agreed that the first two prongs counseled toward overturning Bowers, he strongly disagreed with the third prong, finding that society
has greatly relied upon Bowers' holding that morality is a legitimate basis for
state law.' 29 He noted that "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage,
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are ... sustainable
only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based
' 30
on moral choices."'
After attacking the Court's dismissal of morality as a legitimate state interest, Scalia challenged the Court's failure to recognize any fundamental

123. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas authored his own dissent wherein
he joined Justice Scalia; however, he makes a point of quoting Justice Stewart in
saying "I 'can find [neither in the Bill of Rights nor any other part of the Constitution
a] general right of privacy."' Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) (alteration in
original).
124. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the
most compelling reason... would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious
question." Id. at 2488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992)).
127. Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
128. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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right requiring strict scrutiny.13 1 Scalia claimed that the Court lacked the
"boldness to reverse"
Bowers' conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a
32
fundamental right. 1
Further, Scalia rebutted the Court's assertion "that there is no rational
basis for the law ... under attack.' ' 133 He asserted that the Court's rejection
of morality regulation 1as
a legitimate interest "effectively decrees the end of
34
all morals legislation."'
He then turned to Justice O'Connor's concurrence and argued that there
was no Equal Protection issue because the statute treated men the same as it
treated women; the only material issue was the sex of the accused's partner.135 He also criticized the connection drawn by Justice O'Connor between
conduct and the sexual proclivity of the defendant by stating that "the same
could be said of any law. A law against public nudity targets 'the conduct
that is closely correlated with being a nudist,' and hence 'is targeted at more
than conduct'; it is 'directed toward nudists as a class. ''136 Nevertheless,
Scalia proclaimed that even discrimination against homosexuals as a class
37
was still only subject to rational-basis review, not strict scrutiny.'
Finally, Scalia attacked the Court as "sign[ing] on to the so-called homosexual agenda ... directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct. ' 138 Scalia viewed the Court as
acting in a dictatorial fashion and noted that "persuading one's fellow citizens
is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of democratic majority will
139
is something else."'
Justice Thomas joined Scalia's dissent and embraced Scalia's view of
the Court as dictatorial by adding: "I recognize that as a member of this
Court I0 am not empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situ14
ated."'
V. COMMENT

Oliver Wendall Holmes once said:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2491-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful,
and before which even well settled principles of law will
4
bend.' '

The instant case is a great victory for supporters of a broad right to privacy and homosexual rights, yet it bends well grounded principles of law by
encroaching on the power of the state legislatures and imposing the Court's
political views on the nation.
"One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute
law. What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine."' 142 This is the history of the
so-called right to privacy. As Justice Black warned, "'[p]rivacy' is a broad,
abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but
which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban
1 43
against many things other than searches and seizures."
Many commentators have acknowledged the nebulous origin of the right
to privacy. 144 So, from where did this right emerge? The Court found this
right implicit in the penumbras of the First (freedom of association and freedom from disclosure of associational ties), Third (freedom from being forced
to quarter soldiers in the home), Fourth (freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures), Fifth (freedom from disclosing self-incriminating statements),
Ninth (those rights not enumerated are still held in the people), and Fourteenth (right to life, liberty and due process of law) Amendments to the
45
United States Constitution.
"There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places
with respect to certain activities;"'146 however, none of them guarantees an allencompassing right to privacy. This right, drawn from the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights, has grown into an unruly beast which is a far cry from its innocent birth. In Griswold, it seemed natural for a married couple, not the
government, to regulate the size of their own family. The Court specifically
141. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. Junius, Letters, in THE LAWYER'S QUOTATION BOOK: A LEGAL COMPANION
36 (John Reay-Smith ed., 1991).
143. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
144. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting
Roe's acknowledgment of Constitutional silence on the issue); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973) ("[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83 (certain protections are not specifically listed in
the First Amendment, but are nevertheless found in its penumbras).
145. See supra note 46.
146. Griswold,381 U.S. at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
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referred to this right as stemming from the marriagerelationshipas a type of
marital privacy.' 47 Subsequently, in Eisenstadt, unmarried people became
entitled to receive the same treatment as married people under the Equal Protection clause.148 The decision in Eisenstadt has been interpreted as bestowing a right upon the individual to choose whether to bear children, even in the
realm of abortion.' 49 What began as the right to prevent conception has become the right to terminate pregnancy. In Carey, the Court re-characterized
Griswold's holding as enunciating a constitutional protection of "individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
State." 150 Again, the Court transformed prevention into termination.
Bowers halted the developing creation of privacy. It would have been
easy for the Bowers Court to bridge the gap from "decisions in matters of
childbearing" to decisions in matters of sexual relations, but the Bowers Court
refused to take that step. Instead, the Court claimed that in order to be fully
protected, a right must be fundamental, meaning it must be "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."'1'5 In a search of the Nation's "history
and tradition," the Bowers Court found that sodomy was generally criminalized, with the cornerstone of morality at its foundation.15 2 Finding morality
to be a sufficient basis for criminalizing conduct, the Court upheld the Georgia statute.'53 This was the first collision of the right to privacy and a law
based on morality where morality prevailed. Lawrence, however, unleashed
the right to privacy from its Bowers bonds and found that morality was no
longer enough to keep such statutes alive. The Lawrence Court held that "the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice ....
Lawrence could have easily been decided on equal protection grounds,
but the majority passed on that in favor of substantive due process in order to
establish that the right to privacy covered intimate sexual contact between
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home. By deciding the issue on
due process instead of on equal protection grounds, the Court expanded the
right to privacy. In striking down the statute, the Court employed rational
basis review and found that the State's asserted interest in promoting morality

147. Id. at 486.
148. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
149. Roe, 410 U.S. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
150. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
151. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003).
152. Id. at 192-93.
153. Id. at 196.
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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was insufficient to overcome the constitutional challenge. This decision begs
the question of when morality ceased to be a legitimate state interest.
It has been said that "[t]ime is the great legalizer, even in the field of
morals."' 55 It is true that as times change, our notions of morality change.
What was once repugnant is now accepted and sometimes even celebrated.
Often that which is considered repugnant also bears the stigma of illegality.
To account for shifting notions of morality, our society must be flexible
enough to gauge society's current mores.
Such flexibility is usually accomplished through use of the state police
power. In recognizing this, the Court has previously held that "the domain of
sexual morality is pre-eminently a matter of state concern.' 1 56 The reason
this issue has historically been left to the legislatures is because the best way
to reflect society's morals is to allow representatives, elected to speak for the
people, to make the laws. As Chief Justice Burger stated in Furman v. Georgia,157 "[t]he paucity of judicial decisions invalidating legislatively prescribed
punishments is powerful evidence that in this country legislatures have in fact
been responsive-albeit
belatedly at times-to changes in social attitudes and
' 58
moral values."'
Problems arise, however, when the legislature passes a law, presumably
reflecting societal notions of morality that infringes on the individual liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. This is especially true when the underlying morality appears to be in a state of imminent change. Lawrence is a
prime example of this collision of morality and liberty. Not only is the sole
justification for the Texas statute based upon the State's morality, but the
underlying morality is the disapproval of homosexual relationships. Societal
views on homosexuality have been in a constant state of change, gradually
gaining acceptance since the gay rights movements of the 1980s. The Court
found itself faced with the question of "whether the majority may use the
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through opera59
tion of the criminal law."'
Ordinarily, when faced with a question regarding substantive due process, the default standard of review is rational basis; however, the standard
changes to strict scrutiny whenever the issue involves protected conduct or a
protected class. 160 The pre-Bowers cases on right to privacy were judged on
the basis of strict scrutiny because the Court found that the underlying conduct was a constitutionally protected exercise of liberty. 16 1 In Bowers, the
Court was asked to expand the right to privacy to encompass consensual sex155. H.L. Mencken.
156. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
157. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 384.
159. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
160. 16B AM. JUR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw §§ 912-13 (2004).
161. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 438 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1977); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ual conduct between two adult males in the privacy of the home.162 Before it
could do so, the Court found it necessary to determine whether consensual
sodomy was a fundamental right.' 63 Drawing on the traditional definition of
a fundamental right, the Court examined whether the conduct was "'deeply
rooted in our Nation's history and tradition."19164 Upon a finding that it was
165
not, the Court properly refused to include it under the umbrella of privacy.
As a result, the Court reviewed the statute under a rational basis standard and
held that the State's interest in promoting morality67 was legitimate and upheld
the statute. 166 Then Lawrence overruled Bowers.1
The puzzling fact in Lawrence's overruling of Bowers is that the Court
never proclaimed a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy. In overruling
the Bowers holding that there is no fundamental right, the Court should have
declared that there now is a fundamental right. Due to the absence of such a
statement establishing a fundamental right, it appears that the true issue in
Bowers to suffer defeat was the proposition that morality is a legitimate state
interest. Thus, the question arises of how the court can strike down a statute
enacted pursuant to the constitutionally protected police power of the Tenth
Amendment.
In examining Justice Souter's proposition of judicial review, 168 the first
factor to consider is whether "there is a serious factual controversy over the
feasibility of recognizing the claimed right without at the same time making it
impossible for the State to engage in an undoubtedly legitimate exercise of
power."' 169 In Lawrence, the controversy lies in the Appellant's constitutional
guarantees of liberty and due process pinned against the legislature's ability
to reflect its constituents' moral values. The second factor to consider is
whether "facts necessary to resolve the controversy are not readily ascertainable through the judicial process[,] but.., are more readily subject to discovery through legislative factfinding and experimentation."' 170 In Lawrence, the
fact necessary to resolve the controversy is establishing the true view of the
moral majority in the state of Texas. This is best accomplished by allowing
Texas residents to elect those people who best represent their moral values.
Souter concluded that when these two conditions are met,
"judicial review...
17 1
bars any finding that a legislature has acted arbitrarily."'
162. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
163. Id. at 190.
164. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977)).
165. Id. at 190-91.
166. Id. at 196.
167. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
168. See supra note 25.
169. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 786 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 786-87.
171. Id. at 786.
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From this analysis, it appears that the Lawrence Court blatantly overstepped its bounds in striking down the Texas statute. However, even with
morality being a part of the police power, states do not possess a monopoly
on moral judgment. States are still subject to the majority of the Bill of
Rights and their laws may not infringe upon constitutionally protected conduct. On the other hand, mainstream morality-based restrictions on freedom
are considered sufficient to satisfy both the Due Process clause and the Equal
Protection clause. This is shown in the continued existence of laws against
adultery, beastiality, adult incest, and pornography.172 At this point, mainstream morality has supported same-sex marriage bans as well. Why then
was Texas' justification insufficient? The reason is that the Court considered
the statute's underlying moral judgment to be outdated. In interpreting the
Due Process clause, the Court anticipated a change in moral standards and
found that the Texas statute did not comport with the changing ideal of accepting homosexual relationships. To show this changing ideal, the Court
reached around the globe to cite a European Court of Human Rights decision
rejecting a similar statute.t 73 Additionally, the Court asserted that other nations have followed suit, and it demonstrated that a number
74 of states have
already repealed similar laws or choose not to enforce them. 1
The Lawrence analysis is bothersome at best. Laws should respond to
moral change, not anticipate it. By anticipating a moral shift and then treating the laws as though the shift has already occurred, the Court is essentially
displacing the legislature's ability to respond to its constituency. 175 This is a
clear violation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The judiciary's responsibility is to interpret the laws, not the views of society. In utilizing this
form of analysis, the Court is able to push society in the direction it feels society should go. The Court is able to accomplish this because a liberty interest always trumps a morality interest. Thus, whenever an issue reaches the
highest court in the land and the Court decides the state is enacting laws contrary to the Court's notions of morality, the Court may simply encompass the
right at issue within the protection of the amorphous right to privacy. Then,
the Court proclaims the right to be fundamental, subjects any laws limiting it
to strict scrutiny, and consequently changes the morals of the nation.
In loosening the reins on privacy, the Court makes an effort to limit the
length it can run. For example, in Griswold, the Court focused on the fact
that the privacy involved was confined to the marriage relationship and the
intimacies of a husband and wife. 17 6 Then Eisenstadt evaluated a similar
statute on Equal Protection grounds and found that "outlaw[ing] distribution
172. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2483.
174. Id. at 2481-83.
175. This author finds this sort of logic akin to seeing a person on a fifty foot
ledge holding a suicide note, and then pre-empting their action and pushing them off.
176. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
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to unmarried but not to married persons" was invidious discrimination.'

77

Thus, the "marital" privacy found in Griswold morphed into an individual
privacy 8interest in making a decision affecting "whether to bear or beget a
, 7
child."
Roe further extended the individual privacy right regarding the decision
"whether to bear or beget a child" to create a woman's right to decide
"whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 179 The Roe Court also attempted to limit the rapid development of privacy rights by stating four situations where the right to privacy is not absolute and is subject to state limitation. ° However, the limiting language did not last. While it was not a great
leap, Carey again extended privacy's reach by proclaiming that "the right to
privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors
as well as to adults."' 8 ' Though Carey was decided on substantive due process grounds, its rationale is more akin to an equal protection argument-if
adults are allowed to purchase and use contraceptives, minors ought to be
able to as well. The Lawrence Court made the same restraining effort, but it
has already failed. Justice O'Connor's concurrence implied that the Lawrence holding would not affect same-sex marriage bans:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not
mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis
review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest
here, such as ...preserving the traditional institution of

marriage. 182

However, a recent Massachusetts case relied on Lawrence and Loving v.
Virginia'" to find that "the right to marry means little if it does not include
the right to marry the person of one's choice." 184 It then invalidated a statute
banning same-sex marriages.'S5
Justice O'Connor's asserted limitation becomes even more questionable
in light of the fact that the Court has previously held marriage to be a fundamental right, without qualifying that it must be between a man and a

177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
178. Id. at 453.
179. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
180. Id. at 154-55.
181. Carey v.Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977).
182. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2487-88 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
184. Goodridge v.Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003).
185. Id. at 968-69.
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woman. 86 The fundamental right of marriage coupled with Lawrence's emall but destroys the limitation Justice
brace of changing notions of morality
87
O'Connor attempted to impose.'
So, while the Court attempts to limit itself, its own standards of interpretation have turned it into a runaway train and the only way to stop it is to disallow constitutional interpretation based on emerging contemporary values.
Because there is no check on a court's perception of emerging social values,
the judiciary branch should refrain from this style of interpretation. An interpretation must be either retrospective or focused solely on the present and not
on potential trends. The legislature should enact and the judiciary should
react.
VI. CONCLUSION
In each case expanding the right to privacy, dissenters beseeched the
Court not to apply a strict scrutiny analysis for fear that it would ultimately
lead to the judiciary second-guessing legislative wisdom and returning to the
era of Lochner v. New York' 8 where the "Court's members [were] a day-today constitutional convention." 189 It appears that the dissenting fears were
well grounded. Justice Souter put it best in saying
An unenumerated right should not therefore be recognized,
with the effect of displacing the legislative ordering of
things, without the assurance that its recognition would
prove as durable as the recognition of those other rights
differently derived. To recognize a right of lesser promise
would simply create a constitutional regime too uncertain to
bring with it the expectation of finality that is one of this
Court's central obligations in making constitutional decisions. 190
JAYNE T. WOODS

186. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978).
187. Not all courts are striking down same-sex marriage bans, though. The Arizona Court of Appeals recently heard a case asserting same-sex marriage rights.
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003). Despite the plaintiffs' reliance on Lawrence, the court utilized the same rationale as Bowers in proclaiming that same-sex marriages "are neither deeply rooted
in the legal and social history of our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 459 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1977)).
188. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruledin part by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952).
189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
190. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 788-89 (Souter, J., concurring).
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